<th class="colLast">Description</th>
</tr>
+ <tr valign="top">
+ <td class="colFirst"><a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1899">CVE-2013-1899</a></td>
+ <td class="colMid">9.2, 9.1, 9.0</td>
+ <td class="colMid">9.2.4, 9.1.9, 9.0.13</td>
+ <td class="colMid">core server</td>
+ <td class="colMid">A</td>
+ <td class="colLast">A connection request containing a database name that begins with "-" may be crafted to damage or destroy files within a server's data directory</td>
+ </tr>
+
+ <tr valign="top">
+ <td class="colFirst"><a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1900">CVE-2013-1900</a></td>
+ <td class="colMid">9.2, 9.1, 9.0, 8.4</td>
+ <td class="colMid">9.2.4, 9.1.9, 9.0.13, 8.4.17</td>
+ <td class="colMid">contrib module</td>
+ <td class="colMid">C</td>
+ <td class="colLast">Random numbers generated by contrib/pgcrypto functions may be easy for another database user to guess</td>
+ </tr>
+
+ <tr valign="top">
+ <td class="colFirst"><a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1901">CVE-2013-1901</a></td>
+ <td class="colMid">9.2, 9.1</td>
+ <td class="colMid">9.2.4, 9.1.9</td>
+ <td class="colMid">core server</td>
+ <td class="colMid">D</td>
+ <td class="colLast">An unprivileged user can run commands that could interfere with in-progress backups.</td>
+ </tr>
+
+ <tr valign="top">
+ <td class="colFirst"><a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1902">CVE-2013-1902</a></td>
+ <td class="colMid">9.2, 9.1, 9.0, 8.4, 8.3</td>
+ <td class="colMid">9.2.4-1, 9.1.9-1, 9.0.13-1, 8.4.17-1, 8.3.23-3</td>
+ <td class="colMid">packaging</td>
+ <td class="colMid">C</td>
+ <td class="colLast">EnterpriseDB's installers for Linux and Mac OS X created a directory and file in /tmp with predictable names.</td>
+ </tr>
+
+ <tr valign="top">
+ <td class="colFirst"><a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1903">CVE-2013-1903</a></td>
+ <td class="colMid">9.2, 9.1, 9.0, 8.4, 8.3</td>
+ <td class="colMid">9.2.4-1, 9.1.9-1, 9.0.13-1, 8.4.17-1, 8.3.23-3</td>
+ <td class="colMid">packaging</td>
+ <td class="colMid">C</td>
+ <td class="colLast">EnterpriseDB's installers for Linux and Mac OS X passed the database superuser password to a script in an insecure fashion.</td>
+ </tr>
+
<tr valign="top">
<td class="colFirst"><a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-0255">CVE-2013-0255</a></td>
<td class="colMid">9.2, 9.1, 9.0, 8.4, 8.3</td>
</tr>
- <tr valign="top" class="lastrow">
+ <tr valign="top">
<td class="colFirst">client contrib module</td>
<td class="colLast">This vulnerability exists in a contrib module used on the client only.</td>
</tr>
+ <tr valign="top" class="lastrow">
+ <td class="colFirst">packaging</td>
+ <td class="colLast">This vulnerability exists in PostgreSQL binary packaging, e.g. an installer or RPM.</td>
+ </tr>
+
</table>
</div>
--- /dev/null
+{%extends "base/page.html"%}
+{%block title%}2013-04-04 Security Release FAQ{%endblock%}
+{%block contents%}
+
+<h1>2013-04-04 Security Release FAQ</h1>
+
+<p>While this FAQ covers the 2013-04-04 PostgreSQL Security Update in general,
+most of its contents focus on the primary security vulnerability patched in the
+release, <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1899">
+CVE-2013-1899</a>.</p>
+
+<h2>Are there any known exploits "in the wild" for this vulnerability?</h2>
+<p>There are no known exploits at the time of release.</p>
+
+<h2>Who is particularly vulnerable because of this issue?</h2>
+<p>Any system that allows unrestricted access to the PostgreSQL network port,
+such as users running PostgreSQL on a public cloud, is especially vulnerable.
+Users whose servers are only accessible on protected internal networks, or who
+have effective firewalling or other network access restrictions, are less
+vulnerable.</p>
+<p>This is a good general rule for database security: do not allow port access
+to the database server from untrusted networks unless it is absolutely
+necessary. This is as true, or more true, of other database systems as it is of
+PostgreSQL.</p>
+
+<h2>What is the nature of the vulnerability?</h2>
+<p>The vulnerability allows users to use a command-line switch for a PostgreSQL
+connection intended for single-user recovery mode while PostgreSQL is running in
+normal, multiuser mode. This can be used to harm the server.</p>
+
+<h2>What potential exploits are enabled by this vulnerability?</h2>
+<ol>
+<li>Persistent Denial of Service: an unauthenticated attacker may use this
+ vulnerability to cause PostgreSQL error messages to be appended to targeted
+ files in the PostgreSQL data directory on the server. Files corrupted in
+ this way may cause the database server to crash, and to refuse to restart.
+ The database server can be fixed either by editing the files and removing
+ the garbage text, or restoring from backup.</li>
+<li>Configuration Setting Privilege Escalation: in the event that an attacker
+ has a legitimate login on the database server, and the server is configured
+ such that this user name and the database name are identical (e.g. user
+ <i>web</i>, database <i>web</i>), then this vulnerability may be used to
+ temporarily set one configuration variable with the privileges of the
+ superuser.</li>
+<li>Arbitrary Code Execution: if the attacker meets all of the qualifications
+ under 2 above, and has the ability to save files to the filesystem as well
+ (even to the <i>tmp</i> directory), then they can use the vulnerability to
+ load and execute arbitrary C code. SELinux will prevent this specific
+ type of exploit.</li>
+</ol>
+
+<h2>Which major versions of PostgreSQL are affected?</h2>
+<p>Versions 9.0, 9.1 and 9.2.</p>
+<p>Users of version 8.4 are not affected. Users of version 8.3 and earlier are
+not affected by this issue, but are vulnerable to other unpatched security
+vulnerabilities, since those versions are EOL.</p>
+
+<h2>How can users protect themselves?</h2>
+<ul>
+<li>Download the update release and update all of your servers as soon as
+ possible.</li>
+<li>Ensure that PostgreSQL is not open to connections from untrusted networks.
+ </li>
+<li>Audit your database users to be certain that all logins require proper
+ credentials, and that the only logins which exist are legitimate and in
+ current use.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>Use of advanced security frameworks, such as SELinux with PostgreSQL's
+SEPostgres extension, also lessen or eliminate the exposure and potential damage
+from PostgreSQL security vulnerabilities.</p>
+
+<h2>Who was given access to the information about the vulnerability?</h2>
+<p>Specifics about the vulnerability were first disclosed to our security team.
+</p>
+<p>The PostgreSQL Global Development Group (PGDG) has had, for several years, a
+policy granting engineers who build PostgreSQL binary packages to be distributed
+to the public (such as RPMs and Windows installers) early access to be able to
+release information and code so that packages can be ready on the official
+release date. This applied to both minor and major releases. Given the
+increasing prevalence of PostgreSQL-as-a-Service (PGaaS) as a distribution
+mechanism, we are revising this policy to accomodate the case of the cloud
+providers. The new policy is still being edited and should be available soon.
+</p>
+
+<h2>When was the vulnerability discovered?</h2>
+<p>This vulnerability was first reported to the PostgreSQL Global Development
+Group (PGDG) security team on March 12, 2013.</p>
+<p>We filed for the CVE, with the assistance of the Red Hat security team, on
+March 27.</p>
+
+<h2>Who discovered the vulnerability?</h2>
+<p>Mitsumasa Kondo and Kyotaro Horiguchi of NTT Open Source Software Center
+while conducting a security audit. NTT is a longtime contributor to PostgreSQL.
+</p>
+
+<h2>How was the vulnerability reported?</h2>
+<p>Kondo-san and Horiguchi-san sent email to security@postgresql.org.</p>
+
+<h2>As reported by TechCrunch and Hacker News, some entities including cloud
+platform provider Heroku were given early access. Why did this occur?</h2>
+<p>Heroku was given access to updated source code which patched the
+vulnerability at the same time as other packagers. Because Heroku was especially
+vulnerable, the PostgreSQL Core Team worked with them both to secure their
+infrastructure and to use their deployment as a test-bed for the security
+patches, in order to verify that the security update did not break any
+application functionality. Heroku has a history both of working closely with
+community developers, and of testing experimental features in their PostgreSQL
+service.</p>
+
+<h2>Who was given access to the code before the official release?</h2>
+<p>We have two teams that communicate on private lists hosted on the PGDG
+infrastructure. Both teams had access to the source code prior to the release of
+ any packages for analyzing the security patch and then creating packages for
+ distributing PostgreSQL binaries. These are our Security Team and our Packagers
+List. In both cases, these groups had early access in order to participate in
+patching the security hole.</p>
+
+<h2>How can end-users with large deployments or security-sensitive applications
+obtain early access security information?</h2>
+<p>At this time, the PostgreSQL project does not provide users who are not
+directly involved in patching security vulnerabilities or packaging PostgreSQL
+for other users early access to security information, patches, or code. It is
+possible that at some time in the future we may be in a position to offer such
+access, but we are not able to now.</p>
+
+<h2>Was taking the repository private while this security discussion was ongoing
+ the proper thing to do?</h2>
+<p>Given the severity of the vulnerability, the PostgreSQL Core team deliberated
+and determined the security risk posed by having the source code for the fix
+available before the packages were made available outweighed the public’s
+interest in having immediate access.</p>
+<p>Normal procedure for sharing information about security releases is to send
+an announcement our developer mailing list, pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org, a week
+before a new release. Tom Lane did this. Then, due to the severity of the
+security vulnerability, we also sent an announcement to
+pgsql-announce@postgresql.org and to our RSS News feed on our website homepage.
+We did this because we wanted to give DBAs sufficient time to plan for a
+maintenance window to upgrade.</p>
+<p>The timing of the announcements and the release was based on the availability
+of volunteer packagers and release managers to conduct the release.</p>
+
+<h2>How is the PostgreSQL project organized?</h2>
+<p>PostgreSQL Global Development Group (PGDG) is a volunteer-run, global
+organization. We have a six-person core team, a number of Major Contributors and
+several mailing lists that make up the centralized portion of our community.
+<a href="http://www.postgresql.org/community/contributors/">See here for details
+about contributors</a>.</p>
+
+<h2>How are new members added to the Security Team or Packagers?</h2>
+<p>Membership in both groups is maintained by the Core Team.</p>
+
+<h2>How often does PostgreSQL find new security vulnerabilities?</h2>
+<p>We find zero to seven minor security issues a year. This is the first
+security issue of this magnitude since 2006: the "backslash escape encoding
+issue", which affected MySQL and a few other database systems as well.</p>
+
+<h2>How was the vulnerability introduced?</h2>
+<p>It was created as a side effect of a refactoring effort to make establishing
+new connections to a PostgreSQL server faster, and the associated code more
+maintainable.</p>
+
+<h2>Who discovers vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL?</h2>
+<p>We are fortunate to have a large pool of security engineers who test
+PostgreSQL regularly and responsibly report security issues so that they can be
+fixed. This includes:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>QA staff at contributing companies like NTT Open Source, EnterpriseDB and
+2ndQuadrant</li>
+<li>Security researchers at the Japanese federal security agency</li>
+<li>Security researchers at security companies, such as Secunia</li>
+<li>Coverity’s Scan Project</li>
+<li>and our large pool of participating community users, who report bugs.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<h2>What else is included in this release?</h2>
+<p>This release also updates four other, minor, security issues which are
+detailed on the <a href="http://www.postgresql.org/support/security">security
+page</a> and in the release announcement. It includes a number of bug fixes for
+PostgreSQL as well, most notably fixes for two potential data corruption issues
+with binary replication.</p>
+
+{%endblock%}
+
projects / pgweb.git / commitdiff